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Abstract 
From the perspective of the ‘Digital Single Market’ geo-blocking widely frustrates the increasingly 
high expectations of European citizens to access culture, services and entertainment on a EU-wide 
basis. Geo-blocking also makes hugely demanded content such as films and TV series inaccessible in 
a legitimate way, with a consequential rise in appeal of online piracy. This article identifies the 
barriers raised by such technical restrictions and explains why the licensing of copyright works on a 
country-by-country basis may still be justified, on objective grounds. It also argues that the current 
emphasis on geo-blocking solely in relation to copyright is misleading since copyright is not the only 
reason why the exploitation of creative works (in particular films) is still rigidly territorial in Europe. 
On the one hand, the need to adapt and make content accessible to Europe’s culturally and 
linguistically diverse audiences may justify a separate exploitation on a territorial basis. On the other 
hand, factors such as a persisting digital divide, a different availability of bandwidth across the EU and 
a significant difference in the purchasing power of European consumers have a partitioning effect of 
the Single Market. This article takes the view that a progressive reduction of geo-blocking measures 
and an effective Europeanization of markets for digital content would urgently require a clarification 
of the conditions under which territorial restrictions may still be considered as a necessary tool to 
preserve cultural diversity and the remuneration of opportunities (e.g. advertising) associated with a 
particular territory. In all other cases EU policy makers should feel free to let the logic of the Digital 
Single Market progressively prevail.  
 
This paper is a pre-edited version of an article that will be published in the European Intellectual 
Property Review (EIPR, Sweet & Maxwell) in 2016.   
The paper draws upon two studies the author carried out with Andrea Renda and Felice Simonelli 
(Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS), Giacomo Luchetta and Alberto Bolognini (Economisti 
Associati) at the request of the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services (DG EPRS) 
of the General Secretariat of the European Parliament: 
1. “Ex-Post Impact Assessment on the implementation, application and effects of Directive 
2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society (InfoSoc) Directive and of its related instruments”; 
2. “The Internal Market aspects of EU Copyright: The added value and options for improving the 
functioning and efficiency of the Single Market in the field of copyright”. 
These works are part of a larger, 3-part study entitled Review of the EU Copyright Framework: 
European Implementation Assessment, EPRS, European Parliament, Brussels (2015), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank.  
The opinions expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author.  
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Introduction 
In its current review of EU copyright rules the European Commission has placed great emphasis on 
geo-blocking measures, which make it impossible for Internet users located in a given European 
country to access websites and to subscribe to online services that are offered to users and consumers 
based in another country, on an exclusive basis.
1
 As emphasized by the Commission, the current 
territoriality of digital markets can also be ensured by commercial and technical practices that end up 
re-routing the consumer to a local website, where the same company can provide its products and 
services at different prices.
2
 In a recent policy document entitled ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe’ the Commission announced that unjustified geo-blocking measures should be prevented since 
they are a significant cause of consumer dissatisfaction and of fragmentation of the Internal Market.
3
 
A public consultation on the EU copyright rules launched by the European Commission in 2013 
evidenced that the vast majority of consumers considered geo-localised content services and the 
related technical restrictions as one of the major copyright-related problems that should be fixed in the 
near future.
4
 In spite of this, the Commission has surprisingly excluded copyright works from the 
scope of an on-going public consultation on geo-blocking and announced that restrictions triggered by 
copyright will be taken into consideration at a later stage.
5
  
From a copyright-related perspective the term 'geo-blocking' refers to technical measures that disable 
access to online content services outside of a geographical area or a Member State where the content 
owners have licensed the commercial exploitation of their works. Geo-blocking measures are therefore 
designed to make territorial licensing agreements effective by limiting access to copyright works to a 
national public or a linguistically homogenous audience located in a given territory.
6
 From the 
perspective of the ‘Digital Single Market’ and of the related strategy the Commission unveiled in early 
May 2015, these practices widely frustrate the increasingly high expectations of European citizens to 
access culture, services and entertainment on a EU-wide basis and, while making hugely demanded 
content inaccessible in a legitimate way, do not help reduce the appeal of online piracy. The European 
Parliament also contributed to the debate on geo-blocking, acknowledging the necessity to find 
adequate solutions for better cross-border accessibility of creative works and arguing that this 
objective may require different interventions, both regulatory and market-led.
7
  
                                                     
1 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe”, 
COM(2015) 192 final, Brussels, 6.05.2015, p. 6 ss.  
2 Ibidem, p. 6.  
3 Ibidem.  
4 See European Commission, “Report on the responses to the Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules”, 
July 2014, available at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/contributions/consultation-report_en.pdf (last 
visited 6 Nov. 2015).  
5 See European Commission, “Public consultation on geo-blocking and other geographically based restrictions when 
shopping and accessing information in the EU”, 24.09.2015, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda 
/en/news/public-consultation-geo-blocking-and-other-geographically-based-restrictions-when-shopping-and (last visited 
6 Nov. 2015).  
6 See Madiega, “Digital Single Market and geo-blocking”, European Parliamentary Research Service, 13.05.2015, available 
at: http://epthinktank.eu/2015/05/13/digital-single-market-and-geo-blocking/ (last visited 6 Nov. 2015).  
7 See European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in 
the information society, 2014/2256(INI), para. 9 and 10, available at http://europarl.europa.edu (last visited 6 Nov. 2015).  
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This article explains why the promise of the EU Commission to remove geo-blocking for copyright 
works in Europe will be very hard (if not impossible) to keep, at least in the near future. Section 2 
briefly explains why, from the perspective of content accessibility on a multi-territorial basis, the 
audiovisual sector raises more problems than the music sector. Section 3 briefly recalls the conditions 
under which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter ‘TFEU’) allows for a 
derogation of copyright’s principle of territoriality and for the constitutional principle of freedom of 
movement (and the policy goal of market integration) to prevail over national protection of intellectual 
property. This section examines briefly whether the principle of exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights is applicable to the online environment. Section 4 raises a distinction between unjustified and 
justified geo-blocking. It explains why territoriality of markets is still relevant in sectors, such as the 
film sector, where licensing copyright works on a country-by-country basis is more profitable than 
multi-territorial exploitations. It also clarifies the justification for mono-territorial licensing, 
attributable to the need to make content accessible to Europe’s culturally and linguistically diverse 
audiences. Section 5 focuses on the legitimacy of territorial licensing agreements from the angle of EU 
competition law and the freedom to provide EU-wide services and draws briefly on recent cases of 
enforcement of Article 101 TFEU in the field of TV services. Section 6 identifies a number of future 
scenarios that might materialize as a result of policy decisions that could be undertaken in order to 
facilitate the emergence of genuinely multi-territorial or EU-wide exploitations of creative works. In 
its conclusive remarks Section 7 draws on the main findings of the article, expressing a preference for 
what seems to be the most suitable and realistic policy solution that would make the logic of the 
Digital Single Market compatible with the need for copyright owners to preserve their main sources of 
funding and the remuneration opportunities associated with a particular territory.  
Territoriality of markets in the music and audiovisual sectors 
In the domain of access to creative content, the European Commission increasingly looks at online 
restrictions based on territoriality of markets as a result of the reluctance and/or inability of the 
creative industries to change and adapt their business models to a borderless environment. Policy 
makers are aware of the fact that, irrespective of geographical restrictions that content creators and 
online content platforms can impose to their customers, Internet users can easily access all content 
they like anyway, using virtual private networks or resorting to file sharing networks or illegal 
streaming sites.
8
  In spite of that, geo-blocking is still a widely pre-dominant practice in Europe, not 
only in the traditional broadcasting sector and in the context of the on-demand services that 
broadcasters have progressively extended to the Internet, but also in purely web-based markets for 
digital content, where the acquisition and exploitation of online rights is still developed on a country-
by-country basis.  
Even though geo-blocking measures restrict accessibility of all kinds of copyright works, the reasons 
that make online exploitations of audiovisual works, and in particular films, rigidly territorial are 
different from those which have affected the digital music sector. By virtue of the fact that they own 
all rights in every EU Member State, owners of copyright films and TV series would already be in a 
position to treat the EU as a digital single area and to license such rights for pan-European 
exploitations. In spite of that, content owners still do not find a cross-border licensing of their 
audiovisual works convenient, with the consequence that they cannot satisfy (at least through the 
intermediation of licensed content services) a huge and genuinely cross-border consumer demand. For 
the licensing of online music rights, instead, at least until 2005 multi-territorial licensing was 
technically impossible because of the structural restrictions created by the exclusivity rights that 
collective rights management organizations (which jointly represent music authors and publishers) 
                                                     
8 A virtual private network (VPN) extends a private network across a shared or public network, such as the Internet. A VPN 
therefore enables Internet users to bypass territorial restrictions by connecting their computers directly to servers located 
in countries where the desired copyright works are made available. 
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granted each other by virtue of mutual representation agreements. On the grounds of these agreements, 
which included online rights, each collecting society ended up administering all rights in the global 
music repertoire in its own country of establishment, where it holds a legal or de facto monopoly. In 
the last decade, a number of EU policy and legislative interventions that culminated with the adoption 
of a comprehensive directive in 2014 brought a significant change to this scenario and paved the way 
for the emergence of new multi-territorial licensing schemes whose implementation has increased the 
accessibility and portability of online music services.
9
 Due to the specificity and complexity of this 
sector, this article will not take it into further consideration.
10
 
Copyright’s territoriality and the (limited) role of the exhaustion principle  
Territoriality is a basic principle of copyright protection at international level
11
 and has been widely 
relied on by the CJEU in its case law.
12
 Territoriality entails that copyright and the rights related to 
copyright are conferred and enforced at national level on the basis of the law of the place where 
protection is claimed (lex loci protectionis).
13
 This means that copyright is granted by national laws 
and is limited – geographically - to the territory of the granting State. Despite the broad harmonisation 
efforts that led to the adoption of many EU directives in the last two decades, there are still core 
aspects of copyright that are defined and implemented in different ways at national level.
14
 Due to the 
principle of copyright’s territoriality, any aspect of copyright that is not harmonised at the EU level 
remains, therefore, regulated by domestic law. In a recent resolution the European Parliament called 
for a reaffirmation of the principle of territoriality, which enables each Member State to protect the 
principle of fair remuneration for creators within the framework of its own cultural policy.
15
 As a 
result, copyright holders own and are entitled to exercise and enforce 28 different national bundles of 
rights separately, to such an extent that – without the implementation of a corrective measure – these 
rights could be used to prevent parallel imports and block a EU-wide circulation of copyright goods on 
the grounds of Article 36 TFEU (i.e., former Article 30 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, hereinafter ‘EC Treaty’). 
The so-called ‘exhaustion’ of intellectual property rights was the corrective measure through which, in 
the pre-digital era, the EU resolved (or at least mitigated) the conflict between national protection of 
intellectual property and the principle of free movement of goods in the ‘Common Market’. The 
                                                     
9 See Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of 
copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, 
O.J. L 84, 20.3.2014. The directive (which will have to be transposed by Member States by April 2016) creates 
obligations for Member States seeking to ensure higher standards of efficiency and transparency for collecting societies 
and forcing these institutions to modernize their licensing activities. Even more importantly, from a Digital Single Market 
perspective, the directive embodies a chapter setting out rules that – by identifying the technical conditions under which 
collecting societies are permitted to issue multi-territorial or EU-wide licenses for musical works – aim at facilitating and 
encouraging the aggregation of repertoires in the process of online rights clearance, with the subsequent creation of 
‘hubs’ and one-stop shops for commercial users.  
10 For an in-depth analysis of the new multi-territorial licensing practices of major music publishers and EU collecting 
societies from 2005 onwards, see Mazziotti, “New licensing models for online music services in the European Union: 
from collective to customized management”, 34 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts, Volume (2011), pp. 757-808.  
11 Cf. Article 5 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, last amended on 28 September 
1979, available at: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698 (last visited 6 Nov. 2015). 
12 See for instance Case C-192/2004, Lagardère Active Broadcast v. Sociéte pour la Perception de la Remuneration 
Equitable (SPRE) and Others, judgment of 14 July 2005. 
13 See Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), O.J. L 199/40, 31.7.2007, Art. 8 
(‘Infringement of intellectual property rights’).  
14 For instance, the moral rights of authors, the notion of ‘author’ with regard to cinematographic works and the concept of 
‘derivative work’ are (still) mainly governed by national copyright laws.  
15 See the European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015, cit. supra note 7, para. 7.  
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principle of exhaustion was defined and implemented for the first time in Deutsche Grammophone v. 
Metro-SB-Grossmärkte,
16
 where the Court of Justice found that, although the EC Treaty (cf. former 
Article 295) reserved the creation and definition of the subject matter of an intellectual property right 
(i.e., the existence of the right) to national law, the exercise of such a right should have been made 
subject to EU law and, in particular, to the core principle of free movement of goods (cf. Article 34 
TFEU, formerly Article 28 of the EC Treaty). The ECJ pointed out that, if a copyright-holder 
exercised his or her exclusive right of distribution by putting a copyright work on the market for the 
first time, his or her right should have been ‘exhausted’, in a way that the right-holder could no longer 
use his or her intellectual property right to block parallel imports and restrict EU-wide trade.
17
  
When it comes to the removal of barriers in the Digital Single Market, one might legitimately wonder 
whether the exhaustion principle can be extended from the realm of physical goods to that of 
intangible goods. In principle, if this doctrine were applied in the digital environment, geo-blocking 
measures could instantaneously be outlawed and be considered as the equivalents of unlawful 
restrictions placed on parallel imports in the circulation of physical goods. At an early stage, before the 
adoption of copyright directives that aimed at regulating use of information goods or creative works in 
digital formats, the ECJ had made it clear in a case concerning a cross-border re-transmission of a film 
- Coditel and Others v. Ciné Vog Films and Others
18
  - that the principle of EU-wide exhaustion 
applied only to the physical dissemination of copyrighted goods, without extending it to intangible 
forms of commercial exploitation such as TV broadcasts. In that case, the Court rejected the idea that 
the principle of free movement of goods and services could allow a Belgian trans-border cable re-
transmission of a copyrighted movie, broadcast in Germany, without the authorisation of the copyright 
owner of the film.  
With the advent of the Internet and, more broadly, of digital networks, the so-called ‘Information 
Society’ Directive codified the conclusion of Coditel and explicitly restricted the scope of the 
exhaustion principle to the sole distribution right, which concerns just physical media.
19
 A 
complementary legislative measure, which was taken also to implement Article 8 of the 1996 WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, was the extension of the right of communication to the public under Article 3 of the 
Information Society Directive through the creation of a specific right to make copyright works 
available through digital networks.
20
   
Despite the clarity of the provisions of the InfoSoc Directive that confine the applicability of 
exhaustion (just) to physical media, a recent judgment of the CJEU raised confusion on the 
applicability of this principle to the online distribution of computer programs.
21
 According to the 
CJEU, if customers, having purchased a computer program under a license granted for an unlimited 
                                                     
16 See Case C-78/70, Deutsche Grammophone v. Metro-SB-Grossmärkte [1971] ECR 487. In this case a German 
manufacturer of sound recordings sought to enforce its copyright in Germany in order to block the import by a third party 
of copies of the records manufactured and sold in France by its local subsidiary. 
17 After having been coined and implemented by the European Court of Justice, the principle of exhaustion progressively 
found legislative recognition in Art. 4(c) of the 1991 Software Directive, which concerns the right of distribution: see 
now Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of 
computer programs, O.J. L 111, 5.5.2009 (which replaced Directive 91/250/EEC, hereinafter ‘Software Directive’). A 
similar provision is embodied in Art. 5(c) of the 1996 Database Directive: see Directive 96/9/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, O.J. L 077, 27.03.1996. 
18 Case C-62/79, Coditel and others v. Ciné Vog Films and others, [1980] ECR 881. 
19 Cf. Art. 4, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society O.J. L 167, 22.6.2001 (hereinafter ‘InfoSoc 
Directive’). 
20 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, signed in Geneva on the 20th of December 1996 (a special agreement under the Berne 
Convention which deals with the protection of works and of the rights of their authors in the digital environment), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=12740 (last visited 6 Nov. 2015). 
21 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp., judgment of 3 July 2012, hereinafter ‘UsedSoft’. 
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period of time, download a copy of the program, the contract in question should be regarded as a sale 
(and not as a service supply) in a way that the copyright owner can no longer control and block a 
second-hand sale of those copies. This means that, under the aforementioned conditions, third parties 
are entitled to acquire software licenses from the original users and to sell them while transferring also 
the related right to download updated copies of the computer program to their own customers without 
infringing the right of distribution of the copyright owner. In UsedSoft the CJEU clarified that, for the 
distribution right to be exhausted, the first acquirer should delete or make the original copy of the 
computer program downloaded onto his/her computer unusable at the time of resale.
22
   
Even though the UsedSoft judgment helps to point out a relevant source of inconsistency under EU 
copyright rules, this judgment is not expected to impact negatively on the online distribution of 
creative works that do not fall (or do not fall entirely: let us think of videogames or mobile phone 
applications) under the definition of ‘computer program’. The main reason why the CJEU found the 
exhaustion principle applicable in that particular case is that, unlike the InfoSoc Directive, the 
Software Directive provides the owner of a computer program with a mere right of distribution of their 
works that, according to the CJEU, applies in both offline and online environments in the same way. 
Due to its enactment at a time (i.e., 1991) when the online environment did not exist and distribution 
occurred exclusively through physical formats, this sector specific directive does not oblige Member 
States to grant a right of making computer programs available on-line, as Article 3 of the InfoSoc 
Directive provides with regard to the generality of copyright works. In a rather formalistic way, the 
CJEU stressed that, to avoid a different a legal treatment that was not reflected in the wording of the 
Software Directive, the limit posed by exhaustion to the distribution right should be equally applied 
irrespectively of whether computer programs are distributed through tangible or intangible formats. In 
that specific case, this conclusion meant that the copyright owner could not legitimately control and 
restrict second-hand sales of her programs, to the detriment of a re-seller and its customers.  
In spite of Usedsoft, there are several reasons that make the applicability of exhaustion to online 
distribution of content unlikely. The fact that the European Commission intervened in UsedSoft to 
endorse the arguments of Oracle and to claim (unsuccessfully) the non-applicability of the exhaustion 
principle in the online environment shows that the Commission is aware of the inconsistencies and 
contradiction which exist between the EU Software Directive and the InfoSoc Directive. This means 
that, to fix the problem, the Commission might consider proposing a legislative amendment in order to 
update the Software Directive in the near future. As regards the immediate effects of UsedSoft, it 
should also be considered that the impact of this judgment was somehow ‘exhausted’ in a relatively 
short time because of the prompt reaction of major software developers and suppliers, who re-drafted 
the existing licenses with their customers in order to make it sure that their contractual relationships 
could be regarded as services and not as sales, rendering Usedsoft inapplicable. Last but not least, as 
acknowledged by the CJEU, the application of the exhaustion principle is conceivable, in the abstract, 
only with regard to online deliveries that grant users the permission to make permanent copies of 
copyright works (i.e. downloads), on condition that the original copy has been deleted or made 
unusable by the first buyer. Without meeting such a factual requirement, which is very difficult if not 
impossible to meet and prove outside of ‘wall gardens’ created by proprietary content platforms such 
as Apple’s iTunes or Amazon’s, the possibility for third parties to freely resell second-hand digital 
works would deprive the right to make copyright works available to the public of much of its 
substance.  
                                                     
22 See UsedSoft, cited supra note 21, para. 78-79. In this judgment the CJEU, acknowledges that ascertaining whether a sold 
copy has been made unusable may prove to be difficult. Still, the Court emphasised that copyright owners who distribute 
computer programmes through physical media (e.g. CD-ROM or DVD) have to face the same problem, since it is only 
with great difficulty that they can make sure the original acquirer has not made copies of the program that she continues 
to use after having sold her material medium. The CJEU concluded that, to solve that problem and to make copies 
traceable, the software owner is allowed to use technological protection measures such as product keys for the 
distribution of both tangible and intangible formats.  
Giuseppe Mazziotti 
6 
In conclusion, it is very unlikely that the exhaustion doctrine may provide a limit to the absolute 
territorial exclusivity stemming from licensing of digital copyright works on a purely national basis 
and pave the way for a ban of geo-blocking measures. The exception to the principle of territoriality in 
the exercise of copyright, which the exhaustion doctrine entails, is likely to remain confined to the 
realm of physical formats also in the digital era. 
Justified and unjustified geo-blocking measures  
Geo-blocking measures raise two kinds of obstacles to the formation of pan-European markets.
23
 On 
the one hand, such restrictions may easily limit cross-border portability and accessibility of copyright 
works for short-term migrants and travellers who have subscribed to online content services in their 
country of residence or domicile and are not able to access the same service when moving to another 
Member State.
24
 On the other hand, geo-blocking can create trade barriers by restricting some EU 
consumers from accessing works that, instead, are available to other EU consumers or obliging them 
to access works just in their country of residence or location, even though the same services or 
products are available in other Member States.
25
 A well-known example of such barriers is given by 
the impossibility for consumers in certain EU countries of subscribing to Netflix, an online movie 
service that has been available for years to consumers located in the UK and Ireland.
26
 Another 
example is the obligation of Apple’s customers to buy content just from their own national iTunes 
stores while being restricted from accessing the different contents and repertoires made available on 
Apple’s stores in other countries.27 
The Digital Single Market strategy of the European Commission requires the progressive 
dismantlement of the aforementioned barriers and urges EU policy makers to ascertain the lawfulness 
of licensing practices that aim at partitioning online markets along national borders (see Sect. 5 
below). As briefly recalled above, the fact that copyright consists of a bundle of exclusive rights 
granted under national copyright laws inevitably encourages an exploitation and enforcement of such 
rights on a territorial basis. As things stand, therefore, forcing copyright holders to license their rights 
on a pan-European basis would negatively impact on freedom of contract, which is a constitutional 
                                                     
23
 See CEPS & Economisti Associati, “Ex-Post Impact Assessment on the implementation, application and effects of 
Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
(InfoSoc) Directive and of its related instruments” in Reynolds (ed), Review of the EU Copyright Framework: European 
Implementation Assessment, EPRS, European Parliament, Brussels (2015), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank, at 109-110.  
24 See Plum Consulting, The economic potential of cross-border pay-to-view and listen audiovisual media services, 
Executive Summary for the European Commission (2012), available at  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/media 
/docs/elecpay/plum_tns_summary_en.pdf (last visited 6 Nov. 2015). 
25 See Plum Consulting, The economic potential of cross-border pay-to-view, op. cit. supra note 24.  
26 For instance, in a big country like Italy Netflix’s services became available just in October 2015.  
27 Apple’s iTunes Music Store, in light of its operation in almost all EU countries, is probably the best example to measure 
the cross-availability, sales and (different) prices of digital music and films in Europe. Empirical evidence on the 
accessibility of content on a cross-border basis within Apple’s content platform shows that, because of the geographical 
restrictions implemented by Apple, less than a half of the all songs and music albums are available in all of the 27 
country music stores: see Gomez & Martens, Language, Copyright and Geographic Segmentation in the EU Digital 
Single Market for Music and Film, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, JRC Technical Reports (2015). 
Moreover, the study found that – due to commercial strategies that draw on the major drivers of content demand  (i.e., 
language and home market bias) – music availability is somewhere between 73 and 82 per cent of what it could be in an 
“open” Digital Single Market, where all music contents would be available in all Member States. The situation is worse 
for digital movies, whose overall availability is estimated at 40 per cent.  
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principle enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and should be treated 
accordingly.
28
  
To strike a balance between the preservation of the freedom of contract of copyright holders and the 
logic of the Digital Single Market, one has to understand whether or not geo-blocking and the 
territorial licences these measure seek to implement are justified by the pursuit of a policy goal. As 
witnessed by industry representatives in the context of a multi-stakeholder dialogue on EU copyright 
rules, the online supply of creative works (and of other types of protected content such as sporting 
events) on a rigidly territorial basis can be the consequence of autonomous commercial decisions of 
right-holders and commercial users aimed at adapting their offerings to culturally and linguistically 
diverse audiences.
29
 Europe’s strong linguistic diversity requires local adaptations of internationally 
appealing films that subtitles, dubbing and other forms of content versioning make possible. Dubbing, 
in particular, is still indispensable for film releases in four of the five largest European markets (i.e. 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain).
30
 Moreover, national business models give copyright holders and 
commercial users the opportunity to price discriminate in order to enable consumers having a very 
different purchasing power in the various Member States to buy their products or subscribe to their 
services. This means that mono-territorial licensing schemes and the implementation of geo-blocking 
measures can often be justified on the basis of commercial motivations such as a lack of demand for 
EU-wide licenses by commercial users who still find the EU an excessively heterogeneous area to be 
treated, commercially, as a single market.  
Another factor unrelated to copyright that must be taken into consideration in order to understand 
whether the territorial exploitation of audiovisual works may give rise to a case of justified geo-
blocking is the necessity of content producers to protect the sources of funding for their creations.
31
 
Film production entails a complex fund-raising activity in both the studio system developed by the US 
film majors and in the European film sector, which is significantly subsidised by public bodies at both 
national and EU level. The reason why territoriality matters for film majors is that it allows these 
content producers to gather a substantive part of a film budget by pre-selling exclusive rights to sales 
agents, distributors, or television broadcasters by territory, by linguistic version and – sometimes - on 
a multi-territorial basis. This business is based on a strong cross-border penetration rate of US movies, 
which have a market share higher than 50% of all cinema admissions all over Europe.
32
 Pre-
production arrangements aim at placing a film in the best competitive position to cover costs (i.e., pre-
sales occur in exchange for upfront payments) and gain profits. To do so, the Hollywood studio system 
has traditionally relied on the creation of windowed releases through subsequent exploitations of 
movies via DVDs, pay TVs and free-to-air TV broadcasts after release in cinemas.
33
 For European 
film productions, instead, territoriality is not an asset per se; it is rather an intrinsic dimension and 
                                                     
28 See A Digital Agenda for Europe, op. cit. supra note 1; see also the European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the 
implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC, op. cit. supra note 7, para. 13 and 29.  
29 See Mazziotti, Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market, CEPS Report, Brussels (2013), available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/publications/copyright-eu-digital-single-market (last visited on 6 Nov. 2015).  
30 See CEPS & Economisti Associati, “Ex-Post Impact Assessment on the implementation, application and effects of 
Directive 2001/29/EC […]”, op. cit. supra note 23, at 114-115.    
31 See European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC, op. cit. supra note 7, 
para. 13, where it is pointed out that ‘…the ability, under the principle of freedom of contract, to select the extent of 
territorial coverage and the type of distribution platform encourages investment in film and television content and 
promotes cultural diversity […]’.  
32 See CEPS & Economisti Associati, “Ex-Post Impact Assessment on the implementation, application and effects of 
Directive 2001/29/EC […]”, op. cit. supra note 23, at 114-115.  
33 As acknowledged by the film majors, windows are currently shrinking in order to meet consumer expectations and 
different release systems (e.g., premium on-demand services) might emerge soon as a result of the progressive 
involvement of prominent online film service providers (e.g. Netflix) in the context of pre-production arrangements: see 
Mazziotti, Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market, op. cit. supra note 29.  
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condition of exploitation associated to the non-international appeal of most of European films and of 
their subject. In addition to that, administrative regulations that apply to funding or co-production 
agreements with public sector institutions (e.g. public broadcasters) do not facilitate cross-border 
licensing for online exploitations. From a regulatory angle, it should be recalled that, unlike US 
movies, the European film sector has widely benefited from subsidies granted at national level by 
governments and other public bodies and, at European level, through the Commission’s ‘Creative 
Europe’ program. 
Finally, it should be considered that territoriality of content production is also indirectly encouraged 
by EU media policy, in particular by Article 13(1) of Directive 2010/13/EU.
34
 This provision requires 
Member States to ensure that media service providers - in their respective jurisdictions - ‘promote, 
where practicable, and by appropriate means, the production of and access to European works’. In 
some Member States, such obligation has been extended to providers of video-on-demand services.
35
 
These obligations aim at preserving the cultural specificities of the various markets in Europe and at 
supporting creativity across Europe by making audiovisual productions targeted at a diverse national 
public economically sustainable.
36
 At the same time, the bounds of these works to national contexts 
(e.g. history, politics, popular characters, stories, humour and so forth) make them appealing just for a 
limited part of the European population in a way that multi-territorial licences for such works might 
never become commercial convenient.
37
  
Is territorial licensing legitimate under EU law? 
The aforementioned remarks suggest that copyright’s territoriality and the mono-territory licensing 
schemes that have been developed so far are somehow justified by reasons that are not related to 
copyright’s national dimension. In the same way as in the videogames or in the sport industry, film 
copyright poses no significant obstacle to pan-European licensing because of the concentration of all 
rights granted at national level in the hands of film producers. Despite such a centralisation of rights, 
territorial licensing schemes and on-demand services relying on geo-blocking measures are still the 
prevalent and probably most profitable way of exploiting copyright in this sector.
38
  
In consideration of the policy objective of market integration set out by the European Commission, the 
lawfulness of licensing agreement which partition the Internal Market and grant exclusivity – for all 
the above-mentioned reasons - on a country by country basis has been increasingly scrutinised. On the 
                                                     
34
 See Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the Coordination of 
Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision 
of Audiovisual Media Services (hereineafter ‘Audiovisual Media Services Directive’) (codified version), O.J. L 95/1, 
15.4.2010, replacing (with no substantive changes) Directive 2007/65.  
35 As reported by KEA and MINES Paris Tech,, Multi-Territory Licensing of Audiovisual Works in the European Union, 
Final Report prepared for the European Commission, DG Information Society and Media  (2010), this obligation exists in 
Poland, Germany, Slovakia and Romania. The study is available at http://www.keanet.eu/docs/mtl%20-
%20full%20report%20en.pdf (last visited on 6 Nov. 2015). 
36 Cf. the European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC, op. cit. supra note 
7, para. 13.  
37 Available data show that, in 2013, four viewers of a European film out of five were based in the same country where the 
film was produced. Moreover, cross-border penetration of EU films is lower than 10% of the overall cinema admissions 
in the majority of national markets. As emphasized by CEPS & Economisti Associati, “Ex-Post Impact Assessment on 
the implementation, application and effects of Directive 2001/29/EC […]”, op. cit. supra note 23, at 114, the same 
situation occurs in the broadcasting sector where multi-national companies such as MTV created country-specific TV 
channels in order to adapt contents to their diverse audiences.  
38 See European Commission, “Green Paper on the Online Distribution of Audiovisual Works in the European Union: 
Opportunities and Challenges towards a Digital Single Market”, COM(2011)427final, Brussels, 13.7.2011, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/audiovisual/green_paper_COM2011_427_en.pdf (last visited 
on 6 Nov. 2015).  
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grounds of the existing primary and secondary laws of the European Union, one can reasonably 
assume that competition law provisions and the freedom to provide cross-border services embodied 
into the so-called 2006 ‘Services Directive’ are the fronts over which the legality of territorial 
licensing will be challenged.  
As far as the tension with competition law is concerned, after having started a formal antitrust 
investigation in January 2014,
39
 the European Commission sent a formal statement of objections to six 
US film studios and Sky UK for a supposed breach of Article 101 TFEU in July 2015.
40
 The 
Commission, acting as the EU’s antitrust authority, took a preliminary view that the contracts that the 
six studios bilaterally concluded with Sky prevented the broadcaster from enabling consumers located 
outside of the UK and Ireland to access, via satellite or online, pay-tv services available in that 
geographical area. The Statement of Objections takes the unprecedented view that the absolute 
territorial exclusivity stemming from the above-mentioned licensing agreements is an unlawful 
restriction of competition in so far as it extends to unsolicited requests for Sky’s pay-tv services by 
consumers located outside of the territory covered by Sky’s license. The unsolicited requests (or 
‘passive sales’) that the Commission is challenging through this investigation occur whenever 
customers residing in a certain Member State seek to buy a product or to access a service that is not 
actively promoted or advertised in that country. If these requests were excluded in the near future from 
the scope of territorial exclusivity, as a result of the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, online content 
deliveries based on national exploitations, especially in the audio-visual and sport sectors, might easily 
end up being eroded, with a subsequent re-definition and re-structuring of such markets. In web-based 
environments, requests coming from consumers located in a geographical area that is not the one 
where the service supplier advertises and promotes its offerings (and gains a license to do so from the 
copyright holders) are likely to have a broader impact on the overall market, from a quantitative 
perspective, than the passive sales that occurred in the physical world. As pointed out in the relevant 
literature, in online markets the role of physical distance between consumers and the place where 
digital content is made available to the public has sharply diminished.
41
 Distance can be interpreted as 
a measure of cultural difference between countries and as preference for cultural proximity.
42
 This 
means that, unlike the pre-digital world, where products and services would hardly have been 
requested in a country without an adequate commercial promotion or advertising strategy (e.g. pursued 
through tangible means), the online environment might easily make digital content services successful 
irrespectively of the country where the content supplier is located, provided that the distributed content 
is accessible (also from a linguistic point of view) and appealing to multiple (i.e., diverse) audiences. 
If the above-mentioned antitrust initiative were successful, the liberalisation of online passive sales 
might become the Trojan horse through which the Commission would reform copyright laws and 
eventually revisit its principle of territoriality.
43
   
In the relevant case law a judgment of the CJEU has shown that the application of EU competition law 
in digital settings might trigger unexpected consequences for territorial licensing in commercially 
                                                     
39 See European Commission, Press Release “Antitrust: Commission investigates restrictions affecting cross border provision 
of pay TV services”, 13.1.2014, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-15_en.htm (last visited on 6 Nov. 
2015).  
40 See European Commission, Press Release “Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections on cross-border 
provision of pay-TV services available in UK and Ireland”, Brussels, 23.7.2015, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5432_en.htm (last visited on 6 Nov. 2015).  
41 See Gomez and Martens, Language, Copyright and Geographic Segmentation in the EU Digital Single Market for Music 
and Film, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 12.  
42 Ibidem.  
43 See Ibañez Colomo, Copyright reform through competition law? The Commission’s statement of objections in the pay TV 
investigation, Chillin’ Competition, 24.7.2015, available at http://chillingcompetition.com (last visited on 6 Nov. 2015), 
who takes a similar view.   
Giuseppe Mazziotti 
10 
significant sectors such as the market for sporting events.
44
 In Premier League the CJEU was asked to 
assess the compatibility with EU law of an agreement under which a Greek broadcaster had acquired 
exclusive rights in the transmission of football matches while undertaking the promise to prevent the 
public from receiving the broadcasts outside of Greece. In this business sector, in the same way as in 
the film sector, exclusivity on a territorial basis is a contractual condition of exploitation that content 
owners have traditionally agreed upon in their licensing activities in order to protect the remuneration 
opportunities of TV broadcasters in a given country. In Premier League the CJEU was not asked to 
evaluate whether territorial exclusivity for the broadcasting of sporting events was lawful under the 
TFEU. Rather, the CJEU focused on whether the content licensor could legitimately restrict the 
owners of restaurants and bars located in the UK from purchasing cards and decoding devices which 
allowed them to receive satellite channel broadcasts of Premier League’s football matches from a 
Greek broadcaster (who had the permission to exploit those football matches just in Greece). The 
answer of the Court to this question was negative. It was held on the basis of Article 101 TFEU that 
the above-mentioned agreement unlawfully restricted the cross-border supply of the decoding devices 
that gave access to the protected content. While reaching its conclusion the Court clearly raised a 
distinction between individual (i.e. private) and profit-making uses of satellite broadcasts, arguing that, 
in that specific case, the pub owners in the UK had made an unauthorised commercial use of the Greek 
broadcasts aimed at reaching a new public and attracting more customers. This means that the Premier 
League judgment did not deal with consumer sales, as the recent antitrust initiative of the Commission 
against Sky UK and the Hollywood studios does. 
On a distinct front, from a consumer perspective, a basic tension exists between territorial licensing 
arrangements and the ‘Services Directive’,45 whose Article 20(2) requires EU Member States to ensure 
that “[…] the general conditions of access to a service, which are made available to the public at large 
by the provider, do not contain discriminatory provisions relating to the nationality or place of 
residence of the recipient, but without precluding the possibility of providing for differences in the 
conditions of access where those differences are directly justified by objective criteria’. It seems 
evident that the compatibility of territorial business models with the principle of non-discrimination of 
access to services on national and/or territorial grounds deserves more attention.  
A very important feature of the provisions of Article 101 TFEU and Article 20(2) of the Services 
Directive is that both leave room for exceptions to their own prescriptions. Article 101(3) makes it 
clear that business deals having partitioning effects on the Internal Market could be authorized or 
exempted from the main prohibition to cartel if they pursue efficiency-related goals and are beneficial 
to consumers.
46
 In a similar way, the Services Directive does not preclude the possibility of providing 
for differences in the conditions of access to a given service if those differences ‘… are directly 
justified by objective criteria’. These provisions clearly indicate that restrictions to competition in the 
Internal Market and a cross-border accessibility of services can be justified – on the basis of objective 
criteria – in order to pursue alternative goals. As suggested more in depth below, one of the policy 
goals for which territorial restrictions could continue to be permitted - as a result of a new set of 
guidelines or a list of exemptions to adopted by law - is that of supporting cultural creations targeted at 
national audiences and having no (or little) international appeal.    
                                                     
44 See, respectively, Joined cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League v. QC Leisure and Others and C-429/08 
Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd, Joined cases, judgment of 4 October 2011 (hereinafter ‘Premier 
League’).  
45 See Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal 
market, O.J. L 376, 27.12.2006 (hereinafter ‘Services Directive’).  
46 Cf. Article 101(3) TFEU, which provides that, under certain conditions, the main prohibition embodied under Article 
101(1) may, however, be declared inapplicable in case of agreements or concerted practices which contribute to 
improving the production of distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.   
Is Geo-Blocking a Real Cause for Concern in Europe? 
11 
Fostering pan-European licensing of audiovisual works while preserving sustainability 
of content production and cultural diversity: how?  
It seems evident that uncertainties about the conditions under which copyright works can be 
legitimately licensed in the online environment will not help a Digital Single Market form and 
develop. To keep their promises about making copyright works more accessible on a pan-European 
basis, EU policy makers might consider clarifying the circumstances under which geo-blocking 
measures can be implemented or used to improve market conditions. Such a clarification would also 
contribute to a better comprehension of whether and how geo-blocking, under certain conditions, may 
benefit content creators, online intermediaries and consumers. To solve the problems created by geo-
blocking, it is worth bearing in mind its positive effects. For instance, territorial restrictions ensured by 
geo-blocking are designed to protect online content suppliers and consumers from infringing copyright 
by accessing unauthorized works. Moreover, geo-blocking helps right-holders and content suppliers to 
price discriminate in order to meet a highly diverse consumer demand in the EU. For example, if 
access to films and TV series were provided on a pan-European basis, with a subsequent removal of 
all forms of geo-blocking in Europe, would Romanian or Bulgarian viewers be given an incentive to 
subscribe to lawful online content services? Would they be willing to pay higher fees, which might be 
closer to the price that German, British or Scandinavian consumers currently pay for the same 
offerings? Would this change discourage or foster online piracy? If online content suppliers had to set 
out a single, optimal price for all EU audiences, the economic value of digital content would decrease 
and, yet, a vast number of consumers with a low purchasing power would find these offerings too 
pricy for their budget.     
There are a number of policy options and related scenarios that would be worth exploring in order to 
facilitate and improve the conditions of cross-border access to creative works, especially in the 
audiovisual sector, where territoriality of exploitations – as it has been argued - still has sound 
justifications.
47
 
a)  As shown by CJEU judgments like Premier League and by the rationale of existing provisions 
under the TFEU and secondary legislation such as the Services Directive, the present situation 
might easily evolve even in the absence of further policy interventions at EU level. As evidenced in 
the relevant literature, CJEU rulings in the field of copyright have gone beyond mere interpretation 
and clarification of existing laws.
48
 The CJEU has progressively set out new standards and EU-
wide concepts whose definition was made necessary, according to the Court, on the grounds of the 
harmonisation goals of all EU copyright directives. If EU policy and lawmakers decided not to 
undertake any legislative action, the activity of the CJEU would continue anyway, at a pace that 
has proven to be increasingly fast and with largely unpredictable results.
49
  
In addition to that, even in the absence of a specific copyright policy action, other factors (which 
have nothing to do with copyright) might influence and facilitate the formation of multi-territorial 
or pan-European digital markets. From a legal point of view, for instance, a stronger and more 
effective harmonisation of contract, consumer and tax laws applicable in the context of online 
media services could certainly help pursue this goal. From a technological and societal perspective, 
                                                     
47 These policy options are also spelt out in CEPS & Economisti Associati, “The Internal Market aspects of EU Copyright: 
The added value and options for improving the functioning and efficiency of the Single Market in the field of copyright”, 
in Reynolds (ed), Review of the EU copyright framework, op. cit. supra note 23, at 288-297.  
48 See, for instance, Griffiths, “The Role of the Court of Justice in the Development of European Union Copyright Law”, in 
Stamatoudi & Torremans (eds), EU Copyright Law. A Commentary, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (2014).   
49 This also entails the consideration of past rulings of the CJEU on crucial aspects of copyright, such as originality of 
creative works, the scope of the exclusive rights of reproduction, communication to the public and distribution and 
copyright exceptions and limitations; the need to secure the enforcement of constitutional principles enshrined in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (especially when it comes to copyright enforcement measures) and in the TFEU: see 
CEPS & Economisti Associati, “The Internal Market aspects of EU Copyright”, op. cit. supra note 47, p. 288-289.  
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moreover, policies aimed at ensuring a wider access to broadband services in all EU countries, the 
achievement of higher degrees of computer literacy across the EU, a broader diffusion of electronic 
payment services and a substantive decrease of online piracy could make market conditions more 
homogenous than now. It is also evident that an increasing diffusion of Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs), which enable Internet users to easily bypass geo-blocking measures and make such 
measures even more ineffective, shows the emergence of a multinational audience that could foster 
and make pan-European advertisement-based services sustainable.  
b)  An alternative solution for the purpose to foster the emergence of digital single markets could be a 
soft law initiative undertaken by EU institutions, especially the European Commission, with the 
aim to define better/common standards in the implementation of existing EU laws. A Commission 
recommendation could provide guidance on the above-mentioned interplay between copyright law 
and EU competition law in order to resolve or mitigate the conflict between exploitation of 
intellectual property rights at national level and the principles of free movement and of freedom to 
provide cross-border services. Such a recommendation could incorporate and define best licensing 
practices that would help copyright holders, especially in the audiovisual sector, to identify ex ante 
the conditions under which they could legitimately continue to exploit their exclusive rights on a 
mono-territorial basis without infringing Article 101 TFEU and the principle of free movement. 
Even though the non-legislative initiatives the Commission has developed in the area of copyright 
management (e.g., on collective management of online music rights) did not result in significant 
improvements, they might be useful enough to show that a proper legislative intervention is 
needed. This is what happened with the 2005 Commission Recommendation on multi-territorial 
licenses of musical works, which failed to achieve the objective of increasing the diffusion of pan-
European licenses and persuaded the Commission to start a legislative action that resulted in 
Directive 2014/26/EU.
50
  
c)  A new legislative measure that clarified ex ante what territorial restrictions should be regarded as 
compatible with the Internal Market could be a more effective alternative to the above-mentioned 
soft law initiative. Such a measure would look like, in terms of objectives and structure, the 
existing block exemption regulations, which complement Article 101(3) TFEU when it comes to 
vertical agreements and concerted practices and, in the field of intellectual property rights, 
technology transfer agreements.
51
  
d)  If EU lawmakers opted for a broader reform of copyright law in order to ensure more consistency 
and uniformity of today’s legislative framework, especially for cross-border exploitations of digital 
works, the issue of territorial exclusivity might be tackled through the implementation of a 
principle of ‘country of origin’ (or ‘country of emission’) for online transmissions of audiovisual 
works.
52
 Such a remedy would extend (and adapt to online content deliveries) a rule that has 
already been implemented under EU law for the determination of the applicable law to satellite 
                                                     
50 See European Commission, “Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for 
legitimate online music services of 18 October 2005”, O.J. L 276, 21.10.2005. 
51 See Commission Regulation (EU) N. 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, O.J. L 102/1, 23.4.2010; 
and Commission Regulation (EU) N. 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the TFEU to 
categories of technology transfer agreements, O.J. L 93/17, 28.3.2014 (which replaced Commission Regulation (EC) N. 
772/2014, expired on 30 April 2014). The advantages of an ex ante approach with regard to unjustified territorial 
limitations and the possibility of regulating online copyright licences with an instrument similar to the technology 
transfer block exemption regulation are pointed out by Strowel, “Towards a European Copyright Law: Four Issues to 
Consider” in Stamatoudi & Torremans (eds), EU Copyright Law. A Commentary, op. cit. supra note 48, p. 1134.  
52 This solution was already considered in European Commission, “Green Paper on the Online Distribution of Audiovisual 
Works in the European Union”, op. cit. supra note 38, pp. 11-14.  
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broadcasts and digital TV services.
53
 The purpose of such a measure would be that of making 
online transmissions of audiovisual works subject to one single national law, i.e., the law of the 
country where the service provider is established or where the content is materially uploaded. At 
the moment, in accordance with a criterion that the CJEU has recently clarified and relied upon to 
determine the law applicable to online infringements, online transmissions should be deemed to be 
subject to the laws of all EU countries where the content transmission is accessible.
54
 In order to be 
applied fairly, such a provision should not deprive content owners and commercial users of the 
possibility of defining the territorial scope of their agreements in a way that allows them to 
calculate the licence fees on the basis of the audiences and territories effectively reached by online 
deliveries. The fact that the European Commission recently launched public consultations for the 
review of both the 1993 Satellite and Cable Directive and the 2010 Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive suggests that the extension of the principle of country of origin for the determination of 
the applicable law to the realm of online content deliveries might be taken into consideration in the 
near future.
55
   
e)  The most ambitious solution, which is also the most demanding and politically unrealistic, at least 
for now, is the creation of a digital single area for pan-European exploitations of audiovisual works 
and the related ban of geo-blocking measures. This creation of such area might be ensured by the 
availability of genuinely EU-wide copyright titles. The creation of a new type of copyright title 
would entail either (i) a proper unification of national laws through the adoption of a uniformly 
applicable regulation across the EU or, alternatively, (ii) the setup of an optional system of EU-
wide copyright protection that would become applicable to creative works registered at a EU 
specialised office or agency (e.g. the Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal Market) by 
copyright holders wishing to exploit and to enforce their rights on an genuinely pan-European 
basis.
56
  
(i)  The first solution, which would be based on the provision of the TFEU allowing for the 
creation of pan-European intellectual property entitlements (Article 118), would entail a 
complete unification of copyright law with a subsequent replacement of national laws in this 
                                                     
53 See Audiovisual Media Services Directive, Art. 2; see also Directive 2007/65 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting 
activities, O.J. L 322/27, 18.12.2007; and Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the co-ordination of 
certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable 
retransmission (hereinafter ‘Satellite and Cable Directive’), O.J. L 248, 6.10.1993. 
54 To determine the law applicable to torts committed online, the CJEU recently applied the so-called ‘accessibility’ criterion, 
according to which an infringement action can be validly brought before the courts of the place where the damage occurs 
or where the act causing such damage takes place: see Case C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, judgment 
of 3 October 2013, para. 42-43. It is evident that the criterion of accessibility in the domain of digital copyright paves the 
way for a multiplication of courts, on the assumption that a copyright enforcement action can be brought in each Member 
State where the infringed work can be accessed, in accordance with the applicable national rules and in relation to the 
damages occurred in each single jurisdiction: see Case C-387/12, Hi Hotel v. Uwe Spoering, judgment of 3 April 2014, 
para. 35 and 38-39 (where the CJEU held that the courts of the Member States where the damage occurs are ‘best placed, 
first, to ascertain whether the rights of copyright guaranteed by the Member State concerned have in fact been infringed 
and, secondly, to determine the nature of the damage caused’). 
55 European Commission, “Consultation on the review of EU Satellite and Cable Directive”, 24.08.2015, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/consultation-review-eu-satellite-and-cable-directive; and European 
Commission, “Public consultation on Directive 2010/13/EU on Audio-Visual Media Services (AVMSD) – A media 
framework for the 21st century”, 6.7.2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-
directive-201013eu-audiovisual-media-services-avmsd-media-framework-21st (last visited on 6 Nov. 2015).  
56 See CEPS & Economisti Associati, “The Internal Market aspects of EU copyright”, op. cit. supra note 47, p. 295-297.   
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field.
57
 A replacement would be a necessary outcome of such a reform since - unlike patents, 
trademarks and industrial designs
,
 - copyright subsists independently of examination and/or 
registration and must continue to subsist by mere operation of the law because of a ‘no 
formalities’ principle laid down under international copyright law.58 This means that for 
copyright a co-existence of EU-wide (i.e., unitary) and national titles would be difficult to 
conceive since it would be hard or impossible to understand what layer of protection applies to 
a single work, in the absence of a registration or an explicit choice by the copyright holder. 
What makes this policy intervention rather unrealistic for now is that it would require the EU 
to dismantle national copyright systems, with a subsequent loss for the Member States of the 
prerogatives they still enjoy under the current system of EU copyright directives and territorial 
protection. Such a new EU regulation would need to deal with all aspects of copyright law, 
including the ones that are not harmonised yet and which would certainly raise contrasts 
between common law and civil law countries.  
(ii)  A second and slightly more realistic solution might be based on the creation of a EU-wide 
layer of protection that copyright holders would have access to on an optional basis (i.e., 
through a registration of their works). This system might become appealing for those who 
wished to effectively exploit copyright on a pan-European basis and take advantage of unified 
and simplified rules, including access to EU-wide enforcement measures. An optional 
registration system for works being exploited on a multi-territorial or EU-wide basis might 
prove to be compatible with the aforementioned ‘no formalities’ principle under international 
copyright law (cf. Article 5 Berne Convention) insofar as registration of copyright works were 
shaped not as a formality for the protection to subsist, but as a procedural step for the 
copyright holder to choose the desired layer of protection. 
Conclusion  
As this article has sought to emphasize, geo-blocking in Europe is not a cause for concern by itself. 
Technical restrictions of access to copyright works, especially in a sector, like the film sector, where 
territoriality is a key factor for commercial exploitation, might still be necessary to protect 
sustainability of content production and the various forms of adaptation and versioning of creative 
content to local and culturally diverse audience. Even though EU copyright directives have been 
enacted mostly for purposes of market integration, such integration is expected to occur without 
depriving authors, content producers and the whole creative industry of the support that their creative 
endeavor and professional content creations deserve. While thinking of copyright’s Europeanization, 
lawmakers should always bear in mind that, institutionally, they are compelled to take the impact of 
new policies and legislative measures on Europe’s cultural and linguistic diversity into account (cf. 
Article 167 TFEU). This means that, for the sake of cultural diversity, an integration of markets for 
creative content might never become a reality in Europe, at least not fully. In addition to that, the 
transition towards a unification of national copyright systems at EU level and the process of creation 
of genuinely pan-European entitlements might be very long. The aforementioned scenarios show that 
an effective Europeanization of the conditions of legitimate online access to culture and entertainment 
and the subsequent removal of geo-blockings might happen in different ways and at different speeds. 
It would be surprising if, after having repeatedly announced measures against geo-blocking at the 
beginning of its mandate, the European Commission headed by Jean-Claude Juncker decided not to 
                                                     
57 See Ullrich, “Harmony and unity of European intellectual property protection”, in Bently & Vaver (eds), Intellectual 
Property in the New Millennium: Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
(2004), at p. 20. 
58 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 5(2).  
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undertake any action in this field and to wait for another groundbreaking judgment of the CJEU. 
Among the above-mentioned policy interventions, for the reasons that this article has tried to 
summarize, the most suitable and realistic one, at least in the near future, would be that of fostering 
pan-European or multi-territorial online content deliveries, especially in the film sector, by detailing 
and codifying (somehow) the conditions under which content owners should remain free to license 
their works on a country-by-country basis without infringing EU law. As pointed out above, this might 
happen either through a soft law initiative of the European Commission or by virtue of a new 
legislative measure which could enact a list of exemptions clearly indicating the circumstances under 
which territorial licensing of online rights would still be compatible with the logic of the Digital Single 
Market. Such a policy intervention would give EU lawmakers the opportunity to fill an existing gap by 
creating a useful interface between copyright, Internal Market legislation, cultural policy and EU 
media law, which still obliges audiovisual media service providers to invest in the production of local 
and diverse creative works whose remuneration opportunities might be closely associated with a 
particular territory. 
 
 
 
